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I BEYOND THE
INDUSTRIAL 
FRAGMENTS
Jobsback, the Coalition’s new industrial 
relations policy, has unions bracing 
themselves for the next election. But the 
labour movement may not be the only 
loser. John Buchanan argues that 
Jobsback’s flawed conception of the jobs 
market means it is highly unlikely to 
achieve what it intends.
Industrial relations is now a major point of 
conflict in the tussle between the ALP and the 
Federal Coalition leading up to the next federal 
election. The debate is not about the issues of the 
1970s—’excessive union power’ and strikes, politi­
cal levies and pickets. Rather, it concerns the nature 
and structure of our industrial relations system. 
Should bargaining be individual or collective ? Should 
unions be organised on a company or multi-em­
ployer basis? Is there a role for industrial tribunals in 
maintaining minimum conditions?
The Federal opposition’s Fightback! manifesto 
committed the Coalition to recasting key elements 
of Australia’s social, political and economic life. 
Jobsback, the Coalition’s new industrial relations 
policy released in October, commits the opposition 
to the most extensive restructuring of the labour 
market and the industrial system since the introduc­
tion of compulsory arbitration nearly a century ago. 
Here I want to assess the conceptual and empirical 
underpinnings of Jobsback. I argue that if imple­
mented Jobsback would further fragment the labour 
market thereby exacerbating current inefficiencies 
and inequalities. Labour market reform is sorely 
needed, but the changes should enhance not dis­
mantle mechanisms of coordination within the in­
dustrial relations system.
The social philosophy underpinning both 
Fightback! and Jobsback is economic liberalism. 
Jobsback begins by assuming a strict dichotomy be­
tween the individual and social institutions: “The 
Coalition believes that our future lies not with 
industrial institutions or systems but the working 
men and women of Australia.” Throughout the
document it is assumed that competition in freely 
operating markets will result in maximum social and 
economic welfare. The market for labour is assumed 
to be no different to any other. Competition be­
tween individuals in the labour markets is the key to 
improved economic performance. The rigorous ap­
plication of this principle means that only agree­
ments between individuals will be recognised at law 
in the new system. These individual contracts, mis­
leadingly called ‘workplace agreements’, will be en­
forceable as common law contracts of employment. 
Unions will be allowed to exist but anyone else may 
be selected by an employee to bargain on their 
behalf.
Jobsback is not simply an old-fashioned con­
servative assault on the trade union movement. 
Rather, it represents a very distinctive attempt to 
make unions irrelevant. For instance, where both 
employers and workers agree, a workplace can re­
main covered by the award system. Either party, 
however, can opt out of the award system.
Jobsback assumes that the award system will slowly 
wither away. A  number of ‘inducements’ have been 
included in the policy to encourage this outcome. 
These include the establishment of a new ‘Office of 
the Employee Advocate’. The Advocate will have 
authority and resources to pursue complaints arising 
from non-compliance with ‘workplace agreements’ 
free of charge to individual employees. The pursuit 
of individual grievances has traditionally been re­
garded as one of the core functions of a union. 
Jobsback also promises minimum standards for 
‘workplace agreement’employees: a [minimum hourly 
rate of pay linked to awards and limited recreational, 
sick and maternity leave. There will be a limitation 
on the amount of damages that can be awarded 
against ‘workplace agreement’ employees who take 
industrial action—but there will be no such limits 
on the liability of workers staying within the award 
system. Where an employer elects to leave the arbi­
tration system, his or her workers will no longer have 
access to it. Under these conditions their employ­
ment conditions will be those prevailing in their 
awards at the time they are deemed to leave the
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system.
In keeping with its rigorous commitment to 
individual choice Jobsback clearly envisages the op­
eration of multiple bargaining units at the workplace. 
Workers will be entitled to join industry, occupa­
tional or enterprise unions or have some other agent 
bargain on their behalf. Employers will be obliged to 
deal with any bona fide agent nominated by an 
employee. Employers could, therefore, also be faced 
with a plethora of regulatory systems operating at the 
workplace. This prescription is obviously at variance 
with union policy of promoting unions along indus­
try lines. It is also at variance with the Business 
Counc il of Austral ia’spolicyofreducingthenumber 
of bargaining units at the workplace.
Finally Jobsback also contains an extensive range 
of new penalties and sanctions. It is assumed through­
out that the common law will play a greater role in 
regulating industrial relations. Traditionally the 
common law has never been kind to unions. And 
sanctions within the award system will be increased— 
including deregistration for any union that com­
mences ‘flow ons’ or comparative wage justice cam­
paigns, increased sanctions for industrial action and
proposals for new ‘essential services’ legislation. 
Employers and employees will be penalised if strike 
pay is agreed to. These proposals will see industrial 
tribunals weakened, undermine union organising 
strategies and nurture individual contracts of em­
ployment. Jobsback assumes these changes will result 
in significant efficiency gains.
However, quite aside from their palatability or 
otherwise to union members, Jobsback's reform pro­
posals also suffer from a number of conceptual and 
empirical problems. The central assumption under­
pinning the policy is that of equal bargaining power 
between employers and workers. The inadequacies 
of this assumption have long been recognised. W ork- 
ers—especially the unskilled and those from minor­
ity groups—often have little choice as to which job 
to take. Labour law has emerged as a special part of 
the legal system to redress some of this inequality. 
The Coalition assumes that because unions and 
employers receive special legal rights, capacities and 
obligations under Australian law that they are ab­
normally privileged. They assert that such a situa­
tion represents an aberration from the “ordinary law 
of the land”. Yet marriages and divorces, for exam-
Perpetuating 
myths about 
our indus­
trial 
relations 
system only 
serves to 
distract 
attention 
from the 
critical issues 
facing 
Australian 
workplaces.
pie, are not regulated by contract law. Equally com- 
panies are regulated on the basis of special principles 
that bequeath large organisations corporate status 
and limit the liability of directors in the event of 
business failure. Both family and company law de­
veloped because of the inadequacies of common law. 
Australian labour law developed for similar reasons.
The economic arguments informing Jobsback are 
also questionable. The major weaknesses of the 
competitive model derives from its assumption that 
the labour market is the same as any other. Genera­
tions of industrial relations and labour market re­
searchers have questioned the validity of this as­
sumption. Labour is not a tangible commodity— 
what is traded is a worker’s ability to work, not the 
work itself. Trade in this potential service cannot be 
analysed in the same way as trade in tangible com­
modities such as second sports cars or antique clocks. 
Labour supply is primarily determined by demo­
graphic factors and social customs—the changing 
role of women and young people in the workforce are 
examples of this. Labour demand is primarily deter­
mined by anticipated demand for output. The price 
of labour is primarily determined by notions of 
acceptable living standards. Conditions of supply 
and demand have some influence, but they are not 
the critical factors determining pay rates. Conse­
quently, while in theory adjustment in the labour 
market can involve either changes in wages or em­
ployment, most change occurs in employment lev­
els.
If the labour market is to be properly understood, 
different concepts from the abstractions of eco­
nomic liberalism are needed. Far from being a poten­
tial clustering of harmony and order, arising from 
free choices made by isolated individuals, the labour 
market is in fact highly structured and fragmented. 
Different segments of the workforce do not compete 
with others for jobs. Instead the workforce is divided 
into a myriad of groups on the basis of industry, firm/ 
enterprise and occupation. The precise nature of 
segmentation in any one sector of the economy 
varies on the basis of production technology, indus­
trial structure and factors such as degree of competi­
tion and extent of monopolisation, as well as the 
outcome of strategies pursued by employers, employ­
ees and unions.
Jobsback's prescriptions for the labour market 
ignore these essential dynamics. From the point of 
view of equity they would enhance the position of 
those with considerable power in the labour market 
and deny the weak access to the resources of either 
collective organisation or state intervention neces­
sary to redress the power imbalance. More signifi­
cantly, by failing to grasp how labour markets actu­
ally work, reforms motivated by a commitment to an 
individual bargaining system would intensify the 
tendency of the labour market to segment. Reliance 
on ‘the market’ for coordinating labour supply and 
demand would leave employers with little choice 
other than to nurture a core of skilled workers
needed for production and draw on unskilled work­
ers as demand fluctuates. The resulting fragmenta­
tion of the labour market would have detrimental 
implications for both efficiency and equity.
It is now recognised that successful modem 
economies require mechanisms in addition to the 
marker to coordinate economic activity. This ap­
plies as much to the Japanese economy where such 
coordination is informal as to the more openly 
regulated, multi-employer bargaining systems in 
countries like Germany. Such coordination does not 
require state control and ownership of the means of 
production. The vital formula for success appears to 
involve concerted action among various social agents. 
The critical policy issue is to identify and nurture 
appropriate social structures that can assist in deliv­
ering negotiated outcomes at national level, yet 
allow flexibility at the local level. Industrial rela­
tions institutions potentially have a very important 
role to play in this regard.
Given our recent experiences in national, indus­
try level and workplace bargaining, Australia is 
currently well placed to develop innovative coordi­
nating mechanisms. On the basis of recent experi­
ence, for example, it would seem possible that gen­
eral wage movements could be regulated by national 
wage cases involving governments, peak level union 
and employer representatives. Training arrangements 
and many employment conditions are probably bet­
ter regulated on an industry, occupational and/or 
regional basis. Bargain ing at such levels has occurred 
in many industries, especially over matters associ­
ated w ith award restructuring. Issues such as the span 
of working hours, on-the-job training arrangements 
and allocation of overtime are probably best handled 
at enterprise or workplace level with local union 
representative reaching agreement with workplace 
managers. While coordination of this kind already 
occurs in the industrial relations system much of it 
has evolved in an ad hoc manner. The challenge is 
to creatively reform our current labour market insti­
tutions, not dismantle them.
This raises important questions for all parties in 
the industrial relations system. For employers one 
critical issue is to reconsider the role of their repre­
sentative associations. For example, German em­
ployer organisations play a central role in the run­
ning of that countries extensive training system. It is 
this coordination that has been so important in 
labour market flexibility in Germany. Equally there 
are major challenges for enterprise-level manage­
ment. General managers need to consider how to 
coordinate their affairs with other firms in their 
industry. They also need to consider how much 
autonomy they give workplace managers. Striking 
an appropriate balance between reliance on external 
labour markets and internal ones is difficult. The 
doctrinaire promotion of individual and enterprise- 
based systems closes off consideration of this vital 
issue.
There are equally as many challenges for unions.
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They have already begun to reduce their number 
through amalgamations and to restructure their cov­
erage along industry lines. This is a complex and 
difficult process, one that few other labour move­
ments in the world have even attempted. These 
initiatives, however, need to be complemented by 
changes in the support provided by the unions to 
their workplace delegates. Without well-resourced, 
well-trained and legally protected workplace repre­
sentatives, the union movement will become very 
vulnerable as more matters are settled at workplace 
and enterprise level.
Public authorities will also have to reconsider 
their function if they are to assist in establishing a 
better coordinated system. The Industrial Relations 
Commission has already commenced this process 
with its review of union and award structures. Its 
preparednesses to register enterprise appendices to 
multi-employer awards is indicative of its ability and 
inclination to create linkages between different ele­
ments of the system. Government agencies also need 
to consider their function. As more issues are subject 
to at least some bargaining at workplace and enter­
prise level there is likely to be an increasing demand 
for information on what is occurring in other estab­
lishments. Equally, government training authorities 
have an important complementary role to play and 
many are already dramatically restructuring their 
affairs to provide greater support.
As in the depression of the 1890s the nature of
relations between employers and employees is again 
firmly on the agenda. The Coalition has clearly 
established that it is now committed to the total 
recasting of these relations by promoting a fully 
fledged system of individual contracts of employ­
ment and “white anting" the current award system 
and unions. Yet, contrary to the implicit assumption 
of Jobsback, the labour market is not like a commod­
ity market. If industrial relations reform istocontrib- 
ute to economic and social development it is essen­
tial that industrial relations policies are framed on 
the basis of an understanding of its dynamics. With- 
out non-market coordinating institutions the labour 
market has a spontaneous tendency to fragment. 
Reforms directed at promoting individual and enter­
prise bargaining ignore this point. The critical issue 
in industrial relations reform is not to increase 
fragmentation but to develop more dynamic and 
responsive mechanisms of coordination. ■
JOHN BUCHANAN is deputy director of the 
Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Re­
search and Teaching (ACIRRT) at the University 
of Sydney. He was previously director of policy 
research in the Commonwealth Department of 
Industrial Relations. This article is based on a more 
extensive analysis of Fightback! in the June 1992 
issue of the Economic and Labour Relations Re­
view.
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